

Abstract


- This project presents SYN attack prevention utilizing Palo Alto, a next-generation Firewall (NGFW).
- Firewalls have evolved beyond simple packet filtering and stateful inspection.
- Many companies are utilizing next-generation firewalls to prevent new threats such as advanced malware and application-layer attacks.
- TCP is the main transport-layer protocol used on the Internet.
- The TCP connection management protocol sets the stage for a Denial of Service (DoS) attack known as the SYN flood attack.
- This Project examines a zone Protection profile with SYN flood protection that is configured to defend an entire ingress zone.
- The NGFW must implement a protection policy against SYN attacks, so that any coordinated or uncoordinated attack must be detected and repelled.
- The network should remain fully operational to legitimate traffic while preventing malicious packets from entering the network.

Project Description

- The handshake process starts when the client sends an initial segment (SYN) to the server, which responds with an acknowledgement segment (SYN, ACK).
- The server awaits an acknowledgement segment (ACK) from the client, which signals the end of the three-way handshake. The connection is then completed.
- In a SYN attack, the attacker sends a large number of TCP SYN segments, without completing the third handshake step.
- With the influx of SYN segments, the server's connection resources become exhausted as they are allocated (but never used) for half-open connections.
- Legitimate clients are then denied service as the server becomes fully allocated.
- The NGFW allows or blocks traffic based on a defined set of security rules.
- The NGFW is located at the edge of a protected network. The NGFW must implement a protection policy against SYN attacks.
- The NGFW must prevent SYN packets from overwhelming the server and allocating all resources.


SYN Flood Protection

- A SYN flood is a type of denial-of-service (DDoS) attack which aims to make a server unavailable to legitimate traffic.
- There are multiple type of attacks that can utilize a SYN flood:
 - Direct attack
 - Spoofed attack
 - Distributed attack
- DoS protection profiles protect critical resources from these attacks.
- Aggregate and Classified DoS Protection Profiles:
 - Aggregate - Sets thresholds that apply to the entire group of devices
 - Classified - Sets flood thresholds that apply to each individual device
- SYN Flood protection includes:
 - SYN cookies - Drops traffic that fails the SYN handshake
 - Random early drop - Drops traffic randomly
- For each flood type, you set three thresholds:
 - Alarm Rate - CPS threshold to trigger an alarm
 - Activate - CPS threshold to activate the flood protection
 - Maximum - The max number of CPS to drop when RED is set
- The thresholds are set to default values, due to them being higher and less likely to drop legitimate traffic.



Test System



- The attacker PC2 is placed outside of the network in the "outside zone" while the victim is located inside the network in the "inside 1" zone.
- PC2 will send SYN packets into the network that will attempt to interfere with PC1's ability to access the network.
- A protection policy is implemented and enabled in the NGFW to detect and prevent the SYN flood attack.
- The NGFW FW1 will prevent these SYN packets from entering the network and block the IP address of the attacker, PC2.
- The attack is monitored through Wireshark to determine that the NGFW is effective in its ability to prevent the SYN flood attack.



Attacker

Experimentation

- A webserver using Apache2 is hosted on PC1 to test the connectivity on the network.
- Hping3 is executed within the terminal on PC2 and would administer the SYN flood attack through port 80 and use a spoofed source address.
- The attack is first executed on the network while it was unprotected to ensure the SYN flood is effective.
- Monitoring through Wireshark showed a large flood of TCP traffic entering the network, making it inaccessible to hosts.
- A classified DoS protection profile is utilized with the action set to SYN cookies and default thresholds.
- The DoS protection policy is implemented as a rule with source-IP-only tracking to reduce the number of resources required.
- The DoS protection policy rule is set to "protect" as the action, and the DoS protection profile is applied when the traffic matches the rule.
- The protection policy is implemented and enabled in the NGFW.
- The attack is tested once again while the network is protected.



Attacker

Results

- The classified profile blocks the appropriate source IP that is sending the SYN packets.
- Legitimate requests are allowed through; the illegitimate SYN packets remain blocked.
- Wireshark shows SYN packets are no longer bombarding the network.
- The network remains operational, and all connected hosts have full access to the network.

Policy OFF

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
72885	25.446231949	203.0.113.65	192.168.100.10	TCP	60	35691 - 80 [SYN] Seq=0
72886	25.446238958	203.0.113.65	192.168.100.10	TCP	60	35692 - 80 [SYN] Seq=0
72889	25.446236855	203.0.113.65	192.168.100.10	TCP	60	35693 - 80 [SYN] Seq=0
72891	25.446248079	203.0.113.65	192.168.100.10	TCP	60	35694 - 80 [SYN] Seq=0
72892	25.446248953	203.0.113.65	192.168.100.10	TCP	60	35695 - 80 [SYN] Seq=0
72895	25.446268876	203.0.113.65	192.168.100.10	TCP	60	35697 - 80 [SYN] Seq=0
72896	25.446269238	203.0.113.65	192.168.100.10	TCP	60	35698 - 80 [SYN] Seq=0
72899	25.446286163	203.0.113.65	192.168.100.10	TCP	60	35698 - 80 [SYN] Seq=0

Policy ON

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
269	51.575313845	203.0.113.10	192.168.100.10	ICMP	80	Destination unreachable
270	51.575315976	203.0.113.10	192.168.100.10	ICMP	80	Destination unreachable
271	51.575319115	203.0.113.10	192.168.100.10	ICMP	80	Destination unreachable
288	55.392165996	192.168.100.254	34.96.84.34	TCP	74	38953 - 443 [SYN] Seq=0
287	56.312184480	34.96.84.34	192.168.100.254	TCP	74	443 - 38953 [SYN, ACK]
451	85.615809926	192.168.100.254	34.96.84.34	TCP	74	38100 - 443 [SYN] Seq=0
452	85.625902238	34.96.84.34	192.168.100.254	TCP	74	443 - 38100 [SYN, ACK]

Lessons Learned

- Setting the DoS protection rule action to, "protect" is required to implement the DoS protection policy rather than using the action, "deny", which doesn't apply a DoS protection profile.
- Spoofed attacks are far more likely to be utilized to prevent the source IP of the attacker from being shown.
- The key concern is differentiating between legitimate traffic and the illegitimate traffic that is part of an attack.
- Sinkholing and rate limiting are not effective mitigation strategies when compared to a NGFW that has an appropriate DoS protection policy.
- Thresholds will likely need to be adjusted based upon the network environment.
- Penetration testing is an essential aspect of security when determining the effectiveness of a firewall.
- Monitoring is necessary to quickly identify an attack based upon the type of traffic.

Conclusions

- It is important to create a policy that utilizes SYN cookies to allow only legitimate traffic.
- Wireshark was effective in monitoring and confirming the DoS protection policy.
- It was important to maintain full connectivity to our hosts to allow them to continue to operate throughout the attack.
- The DoS protection policy was effective in protecting the network from SYN and other similar attacks.
- Future work is recommended to test the utilization of the NGFW in a larger and more complex environment.
- Future work could adjust the following thresholds to suit the environment:
 - Activate rate
 - Alarm Rate
 - Max rate
- When conducting future work, it will be important to implement further protection against:
 - UDP Floods
 - ICMP Floods
 - ICMPv6 Floods
 - Other types of IP Floods

Acknowledgement

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