

FACULTY OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

Utilizing Cyber Armsraces for the Good Guys

Nur Zincir-Heywood


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Dal NIMS Lab: Cybersecurity and ML

Cyber Networks /Applications /Services Systems that can Adapt Identify Different Behaviours



Cyber Security: Bad vs Good



An Artificial Arms Race: Could it Improve Mobile Malware Detectors? Raphael Bronfman-Nadas , Nur Zincir-Heywood Dalhousie University, Canada

> John T. Jacobs Raytheon, USA

IFIP/IEEE TMA 2018


Training Workshop for Educators and Network Engineers on High Speed Network Protocols and Security 2020

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
The State of Malware

- Malware can be easily modified
- A malware detector may see the problem like this



The State of Malware

 Detectors must <u>adapt</u> but also be <u>proactive</u> as the "wild" changes



Arms Race


• This is a competition between attackers (malware) and defenders (malware detectors)



© Warner Bros, 1948

ArmsRace

• We can create the modified malware to be ready



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Malware on Android

- Android malware
 - Many categories with different examples
- Format
 - Modified versions of non malware apps
 - Similar Android permission request combinations



Malware detection on Android

- Identifiable by
 - Permissions Requested
 - Code Features
- Machine Learning
 - Could be a good match
 - 15 to 20 features were effective in past research



Malware Detector Implementation

15 <u>permission features</u> known (and tested) to be related to malware behaviours


- Internet
- Read SMS
- Write SMS
- Read contacts
- Read external storage
- Write external storage
- Install Packages
- Admin
- Accessibility services
- On Boot
- Phone information
- Camera
- Microphone
- Calendar
- GPS




Malware Detector Implementation

8 <u>code features</u> counting known (and tested) to be related to malware behaviours

- Classes
- Classes using interfaces
- Classes containing annotations
- Direct methods
- Virtual methods
- Abstract methods
- Class level Static variables
- Class level Instanced variables





Malware Sources

- We tested malware from
 - Drebin and Genome
 - datasets of malware samples
 - 700 apps used for static training set
 - 300 apps used for validation
 - Co-evolved
 - For testing a subsample of 10000 generated apps were collected
 - GetJar
 - An app store where malware was found







Benign Sources

- We use 2 sources:
 - Fdroid and G-Play
 - widely used open source app stores
- 700 apps of each used for training
- 300 apps of each used for testing





100 generation F-Droid & Google Play

Туре	GA	Co-evolution
Complexity	41	30
Features used	8	6
Precision F-Droid	97.0%	97.5%
Precision Google Play	97.3%	97.8%
Recall on Generated Malware	54.5%	100%

Out in the wild

- GetJar
 - Open Appstore
 - 3 million downloads a day
- Many apps look sketchy
 - All apps marked as malware were hard to detect malware
 - Using Virus total, collection of public malware detectors
 - Confirmed by
 - All apps
 - 9 of 11 correctly marked
- GetJar's app was marked
 - Virus total considers this to be safe.

Detection Rate on GetJar Apps

	Virus Total	C5.0	GP	Arms race GP
MicrowaveRecipies	31%	100%	100%	100%
God of war Wall paper	36%	100%	100%	100%
Facebook Password Hacker	22%	100%	100%	100%
Footcare salon	0%	0%	0%	100%
Application	46%	100%	100%	100%
Saavn_getjar	5%	100%	100%	100%
PS4 emulator	11%	100%	0%	100%
Subway Servers Hack and				
cheat	9%	100%	100%	100%
Miss You - Whatsapp	24%	100%	100%	100%
Cam Scanner License	27%	100%	100%	100%

Most common features

GP	Arms race GP
READ_PHONE_STATE	READ_PHONE_STATE
SEND_SMS	Count of classes
INTERNET	Count of static variables
Count of abstract classes	READ_CALENDER
Count of static variables	SEND_SMS
Count of virtual methods	INTERNET
Count of instanced variables	Count of direct method calls
Count of classes	BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED	RECORD_AUDIO
Count of direct method calls	Count of Classes with interfaces

Darwinian Malware Detectors: Evolutionary Solutions to Android Malware

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ACM SecDef 2019

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ArmsRace

Principles

- Simulate a competition between malware and detectors
- Evolved malware are a prediction of future adversaries
- Focus on privacy leakage malware
- Detector Generation
 - Linear genetic programming
 - Sequence of instructions for virtual machine
 - Read / write memory, read input, math ops
 - Many individuals \rightarrow Gradient of feedback

Assemblyline

Principles

- Services tailored to certain file types
- Rank file from -1000 to 1000, benign to malware
 - Raise alert above 500
- Android service: APKaye
 - Disassemble APK and extract features
 - Check features against rule-base

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VirusTotal

Principles

- One system is good, 70+ systems is better!
- AVG, McAfee, Kaspersky, Symantec, TrendMicro...
- Aggregate results from detectors: more information
- Dynamic analysis also performed (if possible)

Principles

- Submit file or search hash, IP, URL...
- Primary entrypoints: web or API
- Basic API is free but limited
- No need for an account!

Android Malware Dataset (AMD)

- Academic dataset from University of South Florida
- 24,553 malware samples from 2010 to 2016
- 135 varieties from 71 families

CICAndMal2017 (UNB)

- Academic dataset from University of New Brunswick
- 426 malware and 1,700 benign from 2015 to 2017
- Four categories and 42 families


VirusShare

• Community dataset from anonymous donors

- 35,397 malware samples dated 2013 and 2014
- Over 10,000 corrupted files (impossible to decompile)

Experiment Setup

Overview of training / testing



VirusTotal Unknown Results

Dataset	Seen	Unseen	Avg	Min	Max
AMD	24553	0	49.50	19.30	81.97
UNB Ben	1700	0	99.99	99.84	100.00
UNB Mal	426	0	47.95	0.00	80.00
VirusShare	35397	0	53.34	0.00	82.09

- Malware avg. is consistent at $\sim 50\%.$
- Benignware is nearly perfect
- Similar ordering in difficulty to other detectors
- UNB Malware and VirusShare have totally undetectable samples!

Assemblyline Unknown Results

Dataset	Is Malicious?	Detection Rate
AMD	Т	16850/23618 (71.34)
UNB Ben	F	1154/1688 (68.36)
UNB Mal	Т	315/424 (74.29)
VirusShare	Т	16095/20884 (77.07)

- $\bullet\,$ Detection rates are $\sim 15\%$ lower than MOCDroid
- Detection rates are $\sim 23\%$ lower than ArmsRace!
- Poor benignware detection is a factor
 - 9% and 22% lower when UNB Benign removed

MOCDroid Unknown Results

UnknownMalwareBenignDetection RateAMD AMDDrebin GenomeF-Droid21518/24553 (87.64) 15104/24553 (61.52)UNB Ben UNB BenGenomeF-Droid1675/1700 (98.53) 1584/1700 (93.18)UNB Mal UNB MalDrebin GenomeGoogle Play294/426 (69.01) 153/426 (35.92)VirusShare VirusShareDrebin GenomeF-Droid F-Droid19775/20984 (94.24) 15147/20984 (72.18)				
AMD Genome F-Droid 15104/24553 (61.52) UNB Ben Genome F-Droid 1675/1700 (98.53) UNB Ben Drebin Google Play 1584/1700 (93.18) UNB Mal Drebin Google Play 294/426 (69.01) UNB Mal Drebin F-Droid 153/426 (35.92) VirusShare Drebin F-Droid 19775/20984 (94.24)	Unknown	Malware	Benign	Detection Rate
UNB Ben UNB Ben Genome Drebin F-Droid Google Play 1675/1700 (98.53) 1584/1700 (93.18) UNB Mal UNB Mal Drebin Genome Google Play F-Droid 294/426 (69.01) 153/426 (35.92) VirusShare Drebin F-Droid 19775/20984 (94.24)	AMD	Drebin	F-Droid	21518/24553 (87.64)
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UNB Mal Genome F-Droid 153/426 (35.92) VirusShare Drebin F-Droid 19775/20984 (94.24)	UNB Ben	Drebin	Google Play	1584/1700 (93.18)
UNB Mal Genome F-Droid 153/426 (35.92) VirusShare Drebin F-Droid 19775/20984 (94.24)				
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VirusShare Drebin F-Droid 19775/20984 (94.24)	LINE Mal	Cenome	E-Droid	
		Genome	1-Diola	155/420 (55.52)
VirusShare Genome Google Play 15147/20984 (72.18)	VirusShare	Drebin	F-Droid	19775/20984 (94.24)
Virussilare Scholine Soogle Play 15147/20504 (12.10)	VirusShare	Genome	Google Play	15147/20084 (72.18)
	+ nasonarc	Genome	Google 1 lay	10141/20004 (12:10)

- AMD, VirusShare do very well
- UNB Benign: excellent for every model
- No model is very good at UNB Malware
- Train on Drebin: 22% avg. increase

ArmsRace Unknown Results

Unknown	Malware	Benign	Detection Rate
AMD	Drebin	Google Play	24254/24449 (99.20)
AMD	Genome	Google Play	19020/24449 (77.79)
UNB Ben	Drebin	F-Droid	1642/1700 (96.59)
UNB Ben	Drebin	Google Play	1249/1700 (73.47)
UNB Mal	Drebin	Google Play	381/425 (89.65)
UNB Mal	Genome	F-Droid	269/425 (63.29)
VirusShare	Drebin	Google Play	20757/20972 (98.97)
VirusShare	Genome	Google Play	17680/20972 (84.30)

- AMD, VirusShare near perfect with Drebin / Google Play
- UNB Benign: still pretty good
- Train on Drebin: 12% avg. increase
- UNB Malware with Drebin / Google Play \rightarrow Almost 90%!

RETURN ORIENTED PROGRAMME EVOLUTION with ROPER

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NIMS Laboratory @ Dalhousie University Raytheon Space & Airborne Systems https://github.com/oblivia-simplex

ACM SecDef 2017

RETURN ORIENTED PROGRAMME EVOLUTION with ROPER


Questions:

- What is return oriented programming?
- How might evolutionary methods be applied to ROP?
- How do we best cultivate the evolution of ROP payloads?
- What sort of things are they capable of?

3. The Basic Idea

ROPER is a system for evolving populations of ROP-chains for a target executable.

A Quick Introduction to Return Oriented Programming



- SITUATION: You have found an exploitable vulnerability in a target process, and are able to corrupt the instruction pointer.
- PROBLEM: You can't write to executable memory, and you can't execute writeable memory. Old-school shellcode attacks won't work.
- SOLUTION: You can't introduce any code of your own, but you can reuse pieces of memory that are already executable. The trick is rearranging them into something useful.

What is a ROP gadget?

A 'gadget' is any chunk of machine code that

- is already mapped to executable memory
- allows us to regain control of the instruction pointer after it executes


since all we control is the data being read by the process, the only 'gadgets' useful to us are those that


- 1. perform some helpful operation, and then
- 2. alter the instruction pointer according to data we control

 ideally, each gadget will perform its operation, and then finish by sending the instruction pointer to the next gadget we want to make use of

Generalization of the Gadget Concept

- the precise meaning of a 'return' instruction is architecture-dependent; not all architectures implement return as a pop into PC (MIPS, e.g.)
- the essential idea we're after is stack-controlled jumps
- this means we don't need to limit our search to 'return's
- we can broaden it to include any sequence of instructions that culminates in a jump to a location that's determined by the data on the stack
- this gives us what's commonly called 'JOP', or jump-oriented programming







17. Pattern matching

The most basic type of problem that ROPER can breed a population of chains to solve is that achieving a determinate register state in the CPU, specified by a simple pattern consisting of integers and wildcards.

This isn't the most intriguing thing that ROPER can do, but it is fairly useful, automating the ordinary, human task of assembling a ROP chain that prepares the CPU for a system call - to spawn a process, write to a file, open a socket, etc. For example, suppose we wanted to prime the CPU for the call

execv("/bin/sh", ["/bin/sh"], 0);

We'd need a ROP chain that sets r0 and r1 to point to some memory location that contains "/bin/sh", sets r2 to 0, and r7 to 11. Once that's in place spawning a shell is as simple as jumping to any given address that contains an svc instruction.

One of ROPER's more peculiar solutions to this problem - using gadgets from a Tomato router's HTTP daemon - is on the next slide...

18. Example of a Compiled Shell-Popping ROP-chain (by ROPeMe, not ROPER)

	Ruite che.
Payload:	00002d38 pop {r0, pc}
00002d38 deadbeef	0000bb3d pop {r1, r7, pc}
0000bb3d 00000000 4b4e554b	000256f9 pop {r2, r3, r6, pc}
000256f9 00000000 4b4e554b 4b4e554c	0000bb3d pop {r1, r7, pc}
0000bb3d 0000000 000000b	00001804 svc 0x0
00001804 4b4e554a 0000000b	00001808 pop {r4, r8}
	0000180C bx lr

Source: Long Le, ARM Exploitation ROPMAP, Blackhat 2011

Runtime

```
;; Gadget 0
                                                        000166ec
                                                                          cmp r2,#1
000100fc
                 mov r9, r6
                                                        000166f9
                                                                          ble #0x44
00010100
                 ldrb r4,[r6],#1
                                                        00016734
                                                                         mov r2,#9
00010104
                 cmp r4,#9
                                                        00016738
                                                                          cmp r9,r2
                                                                          str r2, [r4,#0x20]
00010108
                 bne #0xffffffb8 ;; = -0x48
                                                        9991673c
0001010c
                 rsb r5, r5, r9
                                                        00016740
                                                                          beg #0×10
                                                                          cmp r3,#9
00010110
                 cmp r5,#9x49
                                                        00016750
00010114
                 movgt r0,#0
                                                        00016754
                                                                          beg #9x14
00010118
                 movle r0,#1
                                                        00016758
                                                                          ldr r3,[r3,#0x20]
0001011c
                 pop {r4,r5,r6,pc}
                                                        0001675c
                                                                         ldr r2, [r4,#0x20]
                                                        00016760
                                                                         cmp r3, r2
                                                                          strgt r3, [r4,#0x20]
;; Gadget 1
                                                        00016764
00012780
                 bne #9x18
                                                        00016768
                                                                         ldr r3, [r4,#0x20]
                                                                          mov r9, r4
00012798
                 mvn r7,#9
                                                        0001676c
0001279c
                 mov r9, r7
                                                        00016770
                                                                          add r3,r3,#1
000127a0
                 pop {r3,r4,r5,r6,r7,pc}
                                                        00016774
                                                                          str r3,[r4,#0x20]
                                                        00016778
                                                                         pop {r4,pc}
;; Gadget 2
00016884
                 beg #9x1c
                                                        ;; Extended Gadget 1
                 ldr r0,[r4,#0x1c]
00016888
                                                        66612786
                                                                         bne #9×18
                 bl #0xfffffff0 ;; = -0x10
0001688c
                                                        00012784
                                                                          add r5,r5,r7
0001687c
                 push r4,lr
                                                        00012788
                                                                          rsb r4,r7,r4
00016880
                 subs r4,r0,#0
                                                        0001278c
                                                                          cmp r4,#9
                 beq #0x1c
00016884
                                                        00012790
                                                                          bgt #0xffffffc8 ;; = -0x38
000168a0
                 mov r9, r1
                                                        00012794
                                                                          b #8
000168a4
                 pop {r4,pc}
                                                        0001279c
                                                                         mov r9, r7
                                                        000127a0
                                                                         pop {r3,r4,r5,r6,r7,pc}
;; Extended Gadget 0
00016890
                str r0,[r4,#0x1c]
                                                        ;; Extended Gadget 2
00016894
                 mov r9, r4
                                                        000155ec
                                                                         b #0x1c
00016898
                 pop \{r4, lr\}
                                                        00015608
                                                                          add sp,sp,#0x58
                 b #0 \times ffffdd8;; = -0 \times 228
                                                        0001560c
                                                                         pop {r4,r5,r6,pc}
0001689c
99916674
                push r4,lr
                                                        ;; Extended Gadget 3
00016678
                 mov r4, r9
0001667c
                ldr r0,[r0,#0x18]
                                                        00016918
                                                                        mov r1, r5
00016680
                 ldr r3,[r4,#0x1c]
                                                        0001691c
                                                                          mov r2.r6
00016684
                 cmp r0,#0
                                                        00016920
                                                                         bl #9xffffff88 ;; = -9x78
00016688
                 ldrne r1,[r0,#9x20]
                                                        000168.8
                                                                         push {r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,lr}
0001668c
                 moveg r1, r0
                                                        000168ac
                                                                         subs r4,r0,#0
00016690
                 cmp r3,#9
                                                        999168b9
                                                                         mov r5, r1
                 ldrne r2, [r3,#0x20]
                                                        000168b4
                                                                          mov r6, r2
00016694
00016698
                 moveg r2,r3
                                                        000168b8
                                                                         beg #0x7c
0001669c
                                                        000168bc
                                                                         mov r9, r1
                 rsb r2, r2, r1
                                                                         mov r1, r4
000166a0
                 cmn r2.#1
                                                        000168-0
999166a4
                 bge #9x48
                                                        999168c4
                                                                         blx r2
```

Table 5.2: Execution trace of a chain that generates the register pattern required for a call to execv("/bin/sh", ["/bin/sh"], NULL) in tomato-RT-N18U-httpd, by modifying its own call stack and executing numerous "stray" or "extended" gadgets, in the *Poclux* population. Modifications to the gadget stack are in red, jumps are in violet, and completion of target CPU pattern is in blue. Free branches are separated by blank lines. The final instruction jumps to the designated stop address, 0x00000000.

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Classifying flowers using using HTTP daemon ROP Chains – Detection Rate 96.6%




Figure 5.15: Map of the Iris dataset. Triangle points represent petal measurements, and square points represent sepal measurements, with length on the X-axis and width on the Y-axis. Colour maps to species: green for *setosa*, maroon for *versicolor*, and pink for *virginia*.




Figure 5.18: A very good run on the Iris classification task, employing the fitness sharing algorithm documented in §4.4.4 (*Ragweb* population). The filled curve surrounding each mean difficulty line again represents the standard deviation of difficulty for that exemplar class.

Training Workshop for Educators and Network Engineers on High Speed Network Protocols and Security 2020

What did we learn?

- Data driven
 - New insight and knowledge
- Input representation
 - Traffic / Text / Usage
- Generalization
 - Time & Location & Evasion
- Output objectives
 - Known behavior
 - Behaviour changed
 - Unknown / new behaviour
 - Value of certainty
 - Training Workshop for Educators and Network Engineers on High Speed Network Protocols and Security 2020

How much prior knowledge?

Data and Objectives More prior info → Constraints search space More prior info → Creates Blind side

How much ground truth?

What is the cost of providing labels? What is the deployment environment? Location, Time, Evasion

What is next?

Ever changing cycle

"Always" Learning to model the "change"

Thank You ③ Questions?





Web: <u>https://web.cs.dal.ca/~zincir</u>

Dal NIMS Lab: <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJYWzpW1bqo</u>

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